What two key values are identified for each performance Parameter in the CDD

Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) specify what the critical performance goals are in a United States Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition under the JCIDS process.

The JCIDS intent for KPPs is to have a few measures stated where the acquisition product either meets the stated performance measure or else the program will be considered a failure per instructions CJCSI 3170.01H – Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. The mandates require 3 to 8 KPPs be specified for a United States Department of Defense major acquisition, known as Acquisition Category 1 or ACAT-I.

The term is defined as "Performance attributes of a system considered critical to the development of an effective military capability. A KPP normally has a threshold representing the minimum acceptable value achievable at low-to-moderate risk, and an objective, representing the desired operational goal but at higher risk in cost, schedule, and performance. KPPs are contained in the Capability Development Document (CDD) and the Capability Production Document (CPD) and are included verbatim in the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB). KPPs are considered Measures of Performance (MOPs) by the operational test community."

Commentary notes that metrics must be chosen carefully, and that they are hard to define and apply throughout a projects life cycle. It is also desired that KPPs of a program avoid repetition, and to be something applicable among different programs such as fuel efficiency. Higher numbers of KPPs are associated to program and schedule instability.

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Report to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

September 2008: 

Defense Acquisitions: 

DOD's Requirements Determination Process Has Not Been Effective in 
Prioritizing Joint Capabilities: 

GAO-08-1060: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-1060, a report to the Committee on Armed Services, 
U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Increasing combat demands and fiscal constraints make it critical for 
the Department of Defense (DOD) to ensure that its weapon system 
investments not only meet the needs of the warfighter, but make the 
most efficient use of available resources. GAO�s past work has shown 
that achieving this balance has been a challenge and weapon programs 
have often experienced cost growth and delayed delivery to the 
warfighter. 

In 2003, DOD implemented the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) to prioritize and ensure that the 
warfighter�s most essential needs are met. In response to Senate Report 
109-69, GAO reported in March 2007 that DOD lacks an effective approach 
to balance its weapon system investments with available resources. 

This follow-on report focuses on (1) whether the JCIDS process has 
achieved its objective to prioritize joint warfighting needs and (2) 
factors that have affected DOD�s ability to effectively implement 
JCIDS. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed JCIDS guidance and capability 
documents and budgetary and programming data on major weapon systems, 
and interviewed DOD officials. 

What GAO Found: 

The JCIDS process has not yet been effective in identifying and 
prioritizing warfighting needs from a joint, departmentwide 
perspective. GAO reviewed JCIDS documentation related to proposals for 
new capabilities and found that most�almost 70 percent�were sponsored 
by the military services, with little involvement from the joint 
community�including the combatant commands (COCOMs), which are largely 
responsible for planning and carrying out military operations. By 
continuing to rely on capability proposals that lack a joint 
perspective, DOD may be losing opportunities to improve joint 
warfighting capabilities and reduce the duplication of capabilities in 
some areas. In addition, virtually all capability proposals that have 
gone through the JCIDS process since 2003 have been validated�or 
approved. DOD continues to have a portfolio with more programs than 
available resources can support. For example, the remaining costs for 
major weapon system programs in DOD�s portfolio went from being about 
four times greater to almost six times greater than annual funding 
available during fiscal year 2000 through 2007. The JCIDS process has 
also proven to be lengthy�taking on average up to 10 months to validate 
a need�which further undermines efforts to effectively respond to the 
needs of the warfighter, especially those that are near-term. 

Figure: Major Defense Acquisition Program Costs Remaining versus Annual 
Appropriations, from Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2007 (Dollars 
in billions): 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the following data: 

Fiscal year: 2000; 
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $94; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $403. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $104; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $338. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $111; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $367. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $137; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $716. 

Fiscal year: 2004 (start of JCIDS implementation); Annual RDTE and 
procurement appropriations: $148; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $780. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $165; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $910. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $157; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $998. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $160; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $927. 

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

[End of figure] 

DOD lacks an analytical approach to prioritize joint capability needs 
and determine the relative importance of capability proposals submitted 
to the JCIDS process. Further, the functional capabilities boards, 
which were established to manage the JCIDS process and facilitate the 
prioritization of needs, have not been staffed or resourced to 
effectively carry out these duties. Instead, the military services 
retain most of DOD�s analytical capacity and resources for requirements 
development. The Joint Staff recently initiated a project to capture 
the near-, mid-, and long-term needs of the services and other defense 
components, and to synthesize them with the needs of the COCOMs. 
However, DOD officials told us that determining how best to integrate 
COCOM and service capability perspectives will be challenging because 
of differences in roles, missions, and time frames. Efforts have also 
begun to streamline the process and reduce the time it takes to 
validate proposals. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending actions aimed at improving DOD�s ability to 
prioritize joint capability needs. DOD generally concurred, but 
believes that current processes and resources in the department are 
sufficient for doing this. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1060]. For more 
information, contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or 
[email protected]. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

JCIDS Is Not Meeting Its Objective to Prioritize Joint Warfighting 
Needs: 

DOD Has Faced Challenges in Implementing JCIDS but Has Efforts Under 
Way to Improve the Prioritization of Joint Needs: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Functional Capabilities Boards: 

Appendix III: Combatant Commands: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Table: 

Table 1: Functional Capabilities Boards: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Relationship between JCIDS Documentation and Key Milestones 
in the Defense Acquisition System: 

Figure 2: Sponsorship of DOD Requirements Documents: 

Figure 3: Status of "JROC Interest" Capability Proposals Submitted to 
JCIDS Process since 2003: 

Figure 4: Costs Remaining versus Annual Appropriations for DOD Major 
Defense Acquisitions from Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2007 
(Billions of Then-Year Dollars): 

Figure 5: Average JCIDS Staffing Days Required for "JROC Interest" 
Capability Documents: 

Figure 6: Combatant Commands with Geographic Responsibilities: 

Abbreviations: 

CDD: capability development document: 

COCOM: combatant command: 

CPD: capability production document: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

FCB: functional capabilities board: 

ICD: initial capabilities document: 

JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System: 

JNN-N: Joint Network Node-Network: 

JROC: Joint Requirements Oversight Council: 

JUON: Joint Urgent Operational Need: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

September 25, 2008: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Department of Defense (DOD) expects the cost to develop and procure 
the major weapon systems in its current portfolio to total $1.6 
trillion--$335 billion of which is expected to be spent over the next 5 
years. Increasing combat demands and escalating fiscal constraints make 
it critical for DOD to ensure that its weapon system investments not 
only meet the needs of the warfighter but make the most efficient use 
of the department's substantial resources. Our past work has shown that 
achieving this balance has been a challenge for DOD and that the 
department has pursued more programs than its resources can support. 
Our work has also shown that DOD has had difficulty translating needs 
into executable programs, which has often led to cost growth and 
delayed delivery of needed capabilities to the warfighter. 

In 2003, DOD implemented the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS)--a requirements generation system intended 
to prioritize and ensure that the most essential needs of the 
warfighter are met.[Footnote 1] Through JCIDS, needs are expected to be 
determined from a joint capabilities perspective, rather than from an 
individual service or program perspective, which can lead to stovepiped 
solutions. In fiscal year 2006, you directed that GAO review how DOD's 
requirements and resource allocation processes can better support 
program stability in major weapon systems acquisition.[Footnote 2] In 
March 2007, we reported that DOD lacks an effective, integrated 
approach to balance its weapon system investments with available 
resources. This follow-on report, also done in response to the fiscal 
year 2006 direction, focuses on requirements management as embodied in 
the JCIDS process.[Footnote 3] Specifically, we (1) determined whether 
the JCIDS process has achieved its objective to prioritize joint 
warfighting needs and (2) identified any factors that have affected 
DOD's ability to effectively implement JCIDS. 

To conduct our work, we reviewed DOD, Joint Staff, and military service 
guidance documents on JCIDS and other interdependent processes; 
budgetary and programming data on major weapon systems; and Joint Staff 
information on the status and sponsorship of capability proposal 
documents submitted to the JCIDS process for review. We also reviewed 
the findings of prior research on DOD requirements by audit agencies 
and DOD-sponsored organizations. We interviewed requirements officials 
from the Joint Staff, DOD's functional capabilities boards, several 
combatant commands (COCOMs),[Footnote 4] and the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force. We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 to August 2008 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. For more information on our 
scope and methodology, see appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

The JCIDS process has not yet met its objective to identify and 
prioritize warfighting needs from a joint capabilities perspective. 
Instead, capabilities continue to be driven primarily by the individual 
services--which sponsored 67 percent of initial capabilities proposals 
submitted since 2003--with little involvement from the COCOMs, which 
are largely responsible for planning and carrying out military 
operations. By continuing to rely on capability proposals that lack a 
joint perspective, DOD may be losing opportunities to improve joint 
warfighting capabilities and reduce the duplication of capabilities in 
some areas. In addition, proposals for new capability needs and system 
solutions are not systematically prioritized across capability and 
mission areas, and virtually all proposals that have gone through JCIDS 
have been validated. The JCIDS process has also proven to be lengthy, 
taking on average up to 10 months to validate a need. Such a protracted 
process further undermines the department's efforts to effectively 
respond to the needs of the warfighter, especially those that are near 
term. 

DOD lacks an analytic framework to prioritize capability proposals 
submitted by component sponsors to the JCIDS process. To date, JCIDS 
largely responds to proposals on a case-by-case basis, rather than 
assessing them from a departmentwide or joint perspective. Further, the 
functional capabilities boards (FCBs), which were established to manage 
the JCIDS process and facilitate the prioritization of needs, have not 
been staffed or resourced to effectively prioritize and address joint 
needs. Instead, the military services retain most of DOD's analytical 
capacity and resources for requirements development. DOD has recently 
taken steps aimed at improving the JCIDS process. For example, the 
Joint Staff recently initiated a project to capture the near-, mid-, 
and long-term needs of the military services and other defense 
components and to synthesize them with the needs of the COCOMs. 
According to DOD officials, however, it will be a challenge to develop 
appropriate criteria and measures for identifying capability gaps and 
determining the relative importance and resource commitment of one gap 
against another--particularly given that the COCOM and service 
capability perspectives are based on different roles, missions, and 
time frames. Efforts are also under way to streamline the JCIDS process 
and reduce the time it takes to validate proposals. 

We are recommending DOD take two actions aimed at ensuring that the 
JCIDS process achieves its objective to identify and prioritize joint 
warfighting needs: (1) develop an analytical approach within JCIDS to 
better prioritize capability needs and (2) determine and allocate 
appropriate resources for joint capabilities development planning. DOD 
partially concurred with the first and concurred with the second 
recommendation. Generally, in responding to these recommendations, DOD 
stated that several current processes and initiatives, both within and 
outside of JCIDS, contribute to the department's total prioritization 
effort and that resources are sufficiently allocated for capabilities 
development planning. However, we believe that the department's 
processes are not well integrated with JCIDS and that the joint 
community--the COCOMs and FCBs--lack the resources to play a stronger 
role in determining joint capability needs. 

Background: 

Historically, new weapon systems have been developed by the military 
services to counter specific threats. Under DOD's Requirements 
Generation System, the precursor to JCIDS, requirements frequently grew 
out of the military services' unique strategic visions and often lacked 
clear linkages to the national military strategy[Footnote 5] and the 
needs of the joint force commanders, who are responsible for carrying 
out military operations. This service-centric, stovepiped approach 
often created weapon systems that lacked interoperability,[Footnote 6] 
were duplicative, or did not fill critical gaps. In a 2002 memo, the 
Secretary of Defense expressed dissatisfaction with the requirements 
system and commented that the system "continues to require things that 
ought not to be required, and does not require things that need to be 
required." 

As part of its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD determined that the 
department needed to shift from threat-based defense planning to a 
capabilities-based model that focuses more on how an adversary might 
fight than who the adversary might be or where a war might be fought. 
[Footnote 7] JCIDS was established to provide the department with an 
integrated, collaborative process to identify and guide development of 
a broad set of new capabilities that address the current and emerging 
security environment. Through JCIDS, capabilities are to be developed 
from national military strategy and should relate to joint concepts 
that describe how the strategy will be implemented. JCIDS is also 
intended to ensure a strong voice for warfighters and identify needs 
from a joint perspective to ensure that current and future warfighters 
are provided the capabilities they need to accomplish assigned 
missions. Furthermore, JCIDS emphasizes that needs be derived in terms 
of capabilities instead of specific system solutions. 

The JCIDS process is overseen by the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC)[Footnote 8] and supports the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, who is responsible for advising the Secretary of 
Defense on the priorities of military requirements in supporting the 
national military strategy. Within JCIDS, FCBs--headed by a general or 
an admiral and made up of military and civilian representatives from 
the military services, joint staff, COCOMs, and the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense--manage different capability area portfolios. 
[Footnote 9] The FCBs are intended to support the JROC by evaluating 
capability needs, recommending enhancements to capabilities 
integration, examining joint priorities, assessing program 
alternatives, and minimizing duplication of effort across the 
department. 

The JCIDS process requires that gaps in military capabilities be 
identified and potential materiel and nonmateriel solutions for filling 
those gaps be developed based on formal capability assessments. The 
results of these capability assessments are formally submitted as 
initial capabilities documents (ICD)--a capability proposal--by a 
military service, defense agency, COCOM, FCB, or other sponsor. ICDs 
are intended to document a specific capability gap or set of gaps that 
exist in joint warfighting functions and propose a prioritized list of 
various solutions to address the gap(s). When a capability proposal is 
submitted, a Joint Staff "gatekeeper" conducts an initial review to 
determine what level of joint interest and review there should be and 
which FCB should take the lead. Capability proposals deemed to have a 
significant impact on joint warfighting, such as those involving 
potential major defense acquisition programs, are designated as "JROC 
interest" and must be validated or approved by the JROC.[Footnote 10] 

A JROC-validated ICD provides the basis for starting a major weapon 
system acquisition. Specifically, it should lead to an analysis of 
alternatives,[Footnote 11] a concept refinement phase, and a decision 
on a preferred system concept. Before a weapon system program is 
approved to begin system development, the sponsor is required to submit 
a capability development document (CDD)--which defines a specific 
solution as identified in the analysis of alternatives--through JCIDS 
for approval by the JROC. The CDD defines the system's key performance 
parameters or attributes against which the delivered increment of 
capability will be measured. Finally, the sponsor prepares a capability 
production document (CPD) to address the production elements of an 
acquisition program prior to the program starting production.[Footnote 
12] Figure 1 shows how the documentation relates to the major 
milestones for a weapon system program in the Defense Acquisition 
System. 

Figure 1: Relationship between JCIDS Documentation and Key Milestones 
in the Defense Acquisition System: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is an illustration of the relationship between JCIDS 
Documentation and Key Milestones in the Defense Acquisition System. The 
following information is depicted: 

Capabilities assessment: 
* Initial capabilities document; 
* Concent decision; 

Analysis of alternative: 
* Milestone A; 

Technology development: 
* Capability development document; 
* Milestone B; 

System development: 
* Capability production document; 
* Milestone C; 

Production: 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

JCIDS Is Not Meeting Its Objective to Prioritize Joint Warfighting 
Needs: 

While JCIDS is intended to determine needs from a joint, departmentwide 
perspective, capability needs continue to be proposed and defined 
primarily by the military services, with little involvement from the 
joint community--including the COCOMs, which plan and implement 
military operations. This can lead to stovepiped and duplicative 
solutions that do not necessarily support a joint force on the 
battlefield. In addition, virtually all of the proposals for new 
capability needs and weapon system solutions completing the JCIDS 
process since 2003 have been validated. The JCIDS process has also 
proven to be lengthy, taking on average up to 10 months to validate a 
need. Such a protracted process further undermines the department's 
efforts to effectively respond to the needs of the warfighter, 
especially those that are near term. 

The Services, Not the Joint Warfighting Community, Continue to Sponsor 
Most JCIDS Proposals: 

Our review of the documentation associated with 90 "JROC interest" ICDs 
submitted to JCIDS since 2003 showed that 60 proposals, or 67 percent, 
were sponsored by a military service, and 23, or 26 percent, were 
sponsored by a COCOM, an FCB, or the Joint Staff. (See fig. 2.) 

Figure 2: Sponsorship of DOD Requirements Documents: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure contains a pie-chart and sub-chart depicting the following 
data: 

90 Capability proposals, July 2003-May 2008 (initial capabilities 
documents: 
Service: 60; 
Other DOD agency: 7; 
Joint military community: 23; 
- COCOM: 12; 
- Joint staff: 8; 
- FCB: 3. 

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

[End of figure] 

JCIDS is intended to encourage collaboration among the services, 
COCOMs, and other DOD organizations to identify joint solutions to 
capability gaps, and there are some cases where this has occurred. For 
example, the Navy submitted a capability proposal through JCIDS to get 
a precision and landing system in place to avoid delays in delivering 
its aircraft carriers in development. The lead FCB reviewed the Navy's 
proposal and recognized that it was similar to a need identified by the 
Air Force and determined that the Air Force's needs could be met under 
the same proposal. However, according to JCIDS officials, FCB, COCOM, 
and other stakeholder reviews have had little influence in promoting 
joint solutions. 

Past studies have also raised concerns that the services and the COCOMs 
do not routinely collaborate to identify possible joint solutions. For 
example, in 2006 the Army Audit Agency recommended that the Army 
improve collaboration with the joint community early in the 
capabilities planning process to improve the quality of its 
capabilities documents and facilitate more timely reviews of proposals 
that are submitted into the JCIDS process.[Footnote 13] In January 
2006, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Panel concluded 
that JCIDS resulted in capabilities that did not meet warfighter needs 
in a timely manner and recommended that JCIDS be replaced with a COCOM- 
led requirements process in which the services and defense agencies 
compete to provide solutions.[Footnote 14] The Defense Science Board 
similarly reported that JCIDS has not provided for increased warfighter 
influence, but instead actually suppresses joint needs in favor of 
military service interests, and recommended an increase in the formal 
participation role of the COCOMs in the JCIDS process.[Footnote 15] The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies has also pointed out 
that while the services are responsible for supplying operationally 
capable armed forces, the COCOMs are responsible for responding to 
threats and executing military operations.[Footnote 16] Therefore, it 
recommended that the Joint Forces Command take the lead in conducting 
capabilities development planning for the COCOMs and become a formal 
member of the JROC. 

By continuing to rely on stovepiped solutions to address capability 
needs, DOD may be losing opportunities to improve joint warfighting 
capabilities and reduce the duplication of capabilities in some areas. 
In January 2006, we reported that military operations continue to be 
hampered by the inability of communication and weapon systems to 
operate effectively together on the battlefield.[Footnote 17] In May 
2007, we reported that while the military services have successfully 
planned and fielded a number of unmanned aerial vehicle systems over 
the past several years, DOD has struggled to coordinate the development 
of these systems across the services and ensure that they complement 
one another and avoid duplicating capabilities.[Footnote 18] 
Specifically, despite similarities in proposed capabilities between two 
key unmanned aerial vehicle systems--the Air Force's Predator program 
and the Army's Warrior program--the Army awarded a separate development 
contract to the same contractor producing the Predator. By taking 
separate tracks to developing these two systems, the Air Force and the 
Army missed an opportunity to identify potential similarities in their 
requirements and thereby avoid redundant or non-interoperable systems. 
Although the Army and Air Force agreed to consider cooperating on the 
acquisition of the two systems, the services are struggling to agree on 
requirements. 

Virtually All Capability Proposals That Have Completed the JCIDS 
Process Are Validated: 

JCIDS is intended to support senior decision makers in identifying and 
prioritizing warfighting capability needs. As such, it is meant to be 
an important tool in maintaining a balanced portfolio of acquisition 
programs that can be executed within available resources. However, the 
vast majority of proposals completing the JCIDS process are approved-- 
or validated. Adding to a portfolio that already contains more programs 
than resources can support is likely to perpetuate instability and poor 
outcomes in weapon system programs. 

Of the 203 JROC-interest capability proposals (ICDs and CDDs) we 
reviewed, 140 completed the JCIDS process and were validated. Of the 
remaining proposals, 57 are still under review, and 6 are considered 
inactive (see fig. 3). According to a Joint Staff representative, some 
proposals are returned to sponsors for modifications because the 
supporting documentation lacked sufficient analysis to justify the 
capability gap and solutions being presented, or because reviewers 
raised other technical concerns that needed to be resolved. Returned 
proposals are usually modified and resubmitted to the JCIDS process. 
The 6 proposals that are considered inactive were not resubmitted by 
the sponsors. 

Figure 3: Status of "JROC Interest" Capability Proposals Submitted to 
JCIDS Process since 2003: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data: 

203 Capabilities proposals (initial capabilities documents and 
capability development documents): 
Validated: 140; 
In-process: 57; 
Inactive: 6. 

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

[End of figure] 

According to JCIDS officials, proposals are not prioritized across 
capability and mission areas. Instead, the extent to which any 
prioritization has occurred within JCIDS has been limited to the key 
performance parameters or requirements within individual capability 
proposals. For example, the Special Forces Command wanted to add 
capabilities to a Navy-sponsored JCIDS proposal--described in a CDD-- 
for a high-speed intratheater surface lift capability to transport 
military units and supplies into shallow and remote areas. However, 
addressing a key capability requested by the Special Forces Command--to 
land a V-22 aircraft on the surface ship--would have necessitated a 
major redesign for the proposed Navy ship and delayed providing 
capabilities to the warfighter by several years. While the JROC agreed 
that the Special Forces Command's requirement was valid, it decided to 
approve the Navy capability proposal without the Special Forces Command 
requirement and requested that a study be undertaken to identify how 
this requirement could be addressed in the future. 

The lack of early prioritization of capability needs through JCIDS 
makes it difficult for DOD to balance its portfolio of weapons 
programs. Validated proposals tend to gain momentum and win approval to 
become formal weapon system programs--in part because other reviews are 
not conducted prior to the start of system development and 
demonstration, or Milestone B. In prior work,[Footnote 19] we found 
that 80 percent of the programs we reviewed entered the acquisition 
system at Milestone B without a Milestone A or other prior major 
review.[Footnote 20] By this time, the military services have already 
established a budget and formed a constituency for their individual 
capability needs. Successful commercial companies we have reviewed 
value and use a disciplined approach to prioritize needs early and 
often--one that views potential product development programs as related 
parts of a companywide portfolio.[Footnote 21] These companies make 
tough decisions to defer or say no to proposed products and achieve a 
balanced portfolio--one that matches requirements with resources and 
weighs near-and long-term needs. 

Since JCIDS was implemented, the number of major defense acquisition 
programs in DOD's portfolio has increased from 77 to 93, or by 21 
percent. This increase is likely to exacerbate an already sizable 
disparity between what programs are expected to cost and available 
funding. The estimated acquisition costs remaining for major weapon 
system programs increased 130 percent from fiscal year 2000 through 
fiscal year 2007, while the annual funding for these programs increased 
by a more modest 67 percent (see fig. 4). During the same time frame, 
the remaining costs for the major weapon systems in DOD's portfolio 
went from being about four times greater to almost six times greater 
than annual funding. 

Figure 4: Costs Remaining versus Annual Appropriations for DOD Major 
Defense Acquisitions from Fiscal Year 2000 through Fiscal Year 2007 
(Billions of Then-Year Dollars): 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the following data: 

Fiscal year: 2000; 
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $94; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $403. 

Fiscal year: 2001; 
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $104; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $338. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $111; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $367. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $137; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $716. 

Fiscal year: 2004 (start of JCIDS implementation); Annual RDTE and 
procurement appropriations: $148; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $780. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $165; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $910. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $157; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $998. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Annual RDTE and procurement appropriations: $160; 
Costs remaining for major defense acquisitions: $927. 

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

[End of figure] 

Shortfalls as significant as this are likely to be fiscally 
unsustainable. As we recently reported, to compensate for funding 
shortfalls, DOD has made unplanned and inefficient program adjustments-
-including shifting funding between programs, deferring work and 
associated costs into the future, or cutting procurement quantities. 
[Footnote 22] Such reactive practices contribute to the instability of 
many programs and undesirable acquisition outcomes. 

JCIDS Has Proven to Be a Lengthy Process: 

The JCIDS process may lack the efficiency and agility needed to respond 
to warfighter needs--especially those that are near term--because the 
review and validation of capability proposals can take a significant 
amount of time. A proposal submitted to JCIDS can go through several 
review and comment resolution phases before consensus is reached on the 
proposal, and through several levels of approval before the JROC 
validates the proposal. Our review of capability proposals submitted to 
JCIDS from fiscal years 2003 through 2008 found that review and 
validation takes on average 8 to 10 months (see fig. 5). JCIDS and 
service officials also indicated that prior to submitting a JCIDS 
proposal, the sponsor can take a year or more to complete a 
capabilities-based assessment and get a proposal approved. In other 
words, 2 years or more can elapse from the time a capability need is 
identified by a sponsor to the time the capability is validated by the 
JROC. 

Figure 5: Average JCIDS Staffing Days Required for "JROC Interest" 
Capability Documents: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a multiple horizontal bar graph depicting the following 
data: 

Status of capability proposals: Validated proposals; 
ICD: 319 days; 
CDD: 242 days. 

Status of capability proposals: In-process proposals; 
ICD: 433 days; 
CDD: 476 days. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[End of figure] 

Given the size and complexity and level of funding that will be 
committed to many of these capability needs, the length of the process 
may be warranted. However, concerns have been raised by officials 
within the department about how responsive JCIDS can be--concerns that 
may prompt some sponsors to bypass the process. According to some 
department officials, too much time is spent reviewing individual 
capability proposals with little evidence of increased attention to 
prioritization or jointness. Senior COCOM officials we spoke with also 
stated that the JCIDS process is not conducive to addressing near-term 
requirements--the primary focus of the COCOMs--and that the lengthy 
nature of the JCIDS process makes it difficult to adjust to emerging 
needs. In one case, the Army used extraordinary measures, going outside 
DOD's normal requirements, acquisition, and budgeting process to 
acquire and field the Joint Network Node-Network (JNN-N)--a $2 billion, 
commercial-based system designed to improve satellite communication 
capabilities for deployed military units in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
[Footnote 23] While JNN-N provided enhanced capability for the 
warfighter, the work-around allowed the Army to bypass the management 
and oversight typically required of DOD programs of this magnitude. 
[Footnote 24] 

In 2005, DOD established the Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) 
process to respond to urgent needs associated with combat operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and the war on terror.[Footnote 25] The JUON 
process is intended to prevent mission failure or loss of life and is 
generally considered to be more efficient than JCIDS for meeting urgent 
needs. However, short-term needs that do not qualify as urgent 
operational needs--such as JNN-N--must still go through JCIDS. 

DOD Has Faced Challenges in Implementing JCIDS but Has Efforts Under 
Way to Improve the Prioritization of Joint Needs: 

DOD lacks the necessary framework for more effective implementation of 
JCIDS. The department has not yet developed a structured, analytical 
approach to prioritize capability proposals submitted to the JCIDS 
process. Additionally, the FCBs, which were established to manage the 
JCIDS process, do not have the capacity to effectively take the lead in 
prioritizing capability needs. Without an approach and entity in charge 
to determine what capabilities are needed, all proposals tend to be 
treated as priorities within the JCIDS process. The Joint Staff has 
recently taken steps to improve the prioritization of capability needs 
across DOD. 

DOD Lacks an Effective Structure to Facilitate the Prioritization of 
Capability Needs: 

DOD's failure to prioritize capability needs through the JCIDS process 
is due in part to the lack of an analytic framework to determine and 
manage capability needs from a departmentwide perspective. To date, 
JCIDS largely responds to capability proposals that are submitted by 
component sponsors on a case-by-case basis. Lacking a more proactive 
approach, JCIDS has been ineffective at integrating and balancing needs 
from the military services, COCOMs, and other defense components. DOD 
has several different approaches to identify capability needs but they 
do not appear to be well integrated with JCIDS. For example, each COCOM 
submits annually to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff an 
integrated priority list, which defines the COCOM's highest-priority 
capability gaps for the near term, including shortfalls that may 
adversely affect COCOM missions. However, it is unclear to what extent 
integrated priority lists or other approaches, such as JUONs and 
lessons learned from recent and ongoing military operations, inform the 
JCIDS process. According to officials from several COCOMs, needs 
identified through integrated priority lists are not typically 
developed into JCIDS capability proposals. These officials indicated 
that to be successful in getting a need addressed, they have to build a 
coalition with one or more services that may have similar needs. 

At the same time, the military services continue to drive the 
determination of capability needs, in part because they retain most of 
DOD's analytical capacity and resources for requirements development. 
According to Air Force and Army officials, they have several hundred 
staff involved in capabilities planning and development. In contrast, 
the FCBs are relatively small, with the majority having 12 or fewer 
staff members. FCB officials noted that the assessments that must be 
conducted to support a capability proposal can cost several million 
dollars and require several staff years of effort. Consequently, the 
FCBs only sponsored five capability development proposals over the last 
5 years and generally devote most of their time and effort to reviewing 
documents submitted by sponsors and providing recommendations on them 
to the JROC. In March 2008, we reported that the FCB responsible for 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities lacked 
sufficient resources to engage in early coordination with sponsors and 
review the sponsors' capability assessments.[Footnote 26] 
Representatives from several of the FCBs also indicated that they lack 
the expertise to effectively weigh in on the technical feasibility and 
costs of sponsors' capability proposals and identify trade-offs that 
may be needed to modify proposals. A study performed under contract for 
the Joint Staff in July 2007 also found that some FCBs were under 
resourced for performing their duties.[Footnote 27] 

COCOMs, particularly the regional commands, also lack analytic capacity 
and resources to become more fully engaged in JCIDS--either by 
developing their own capability assessments or participating in reviews 
and commenting on proposals submitted to JCIDS. Some COCOM officials 
pointed out that because of their limited resources, they must pick and 
choose capability proposals to get involved in. Several studies have 
recommended that DOD increase joint analytic resources for a less 
stovepiped understanding of warfighting needs.[Footnote 28] 

Efforts Under Way to Improve Prioritization and Streamline the JCIDS 
Process: 

In 2006, the JROC developed a most pressing military issues list in an 
effort to identify the most important high-level issues facing the 
department and thereby provide better guidance to sponsors and FCBs on 
what capability assessments to focus on. In addition, the JROC directed 
the FCBs to develop and implement an approach to synthesize the COCOMs' 
annual integrated priority lists and bring greater focus to 
prioritizing joint capability needs. This resulted, in 2007, in a 
consolidated list of capability needs. The JROC has also increased its 
involvement with the COCOMs through regular trips and meetings to 
discuss capability needs and resourcing issues. According to joint 
staff officials, these efforts have helped the JROC gain an increased 
understanding of the COCOMs' needs as well as provided the COCOMs with 
a forum for communicating their needs. Officials from several COCOMs 
noted that many of the near-term needs reflected in their integrated 
priority lists are now being addressed more effectively through annual 
budget adjustments and force structure changes. 

At the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff 
has also recently begun a project to provide a more systematic approach 
to prioritizing capability areas and gaps that need to be addressed 
across the department. This effort is intended to identify the near-, 
mid-, and long-term needs of the military services and other defense 
components and synthesize them with the needs of the COCOMs. The 
project's first step, which is expected to be completed by the Joint 
Staff by the end of 2008, focuses on establishing what capabilities are 
most important to carrying out military operations either now or in the 
future. Capability areas will then be assessed to identify and 
prioritize where deficiencies or gaps in capabilities exist, and where 
additional capabilities may or may not be needed. The framework being 
used in the project is similar to one that the Institute for Defense 
Analysis developed with the U.S. Pacific Command a few years ago to 
strengthen the analytical basis for the integrated priority lists. The 
framework used by U.S. Pacific Command links capability needs to 
elements of the operational plans that the command is responsible for 
executing. Capability needs are determined by consolidating the views 
of operational planners, capability developers, and other subject 
matter experts from within the command. 

If the project achieves expected results, the FCBs--and ultimately, the 
JROC--would be able to screen new capabilities proposals during the 
JCIDS review process while having knowledge of the capacity and 
sufficiency of existing requirements. According to Joint Staff 
officials, however, there are key challenges to implementing the 
project and coming up with a credible prioritization of capability 
needs. A major challenge will be to determine how best to integrate 
service and COCOM capability perspectives that are typically based on 
different roles, missions, and time frames. The military services tend 
to address capabilities in terms of defense planning scenarios that 
identify the mid-and long-term challenges the department must be 
prepared to handle. This has led to the development of capability 
proposals that advocate the need for the "next generation" of weapon 
system capability. In contrast, the COCOMs tend to address capabilities 
in terms of being able to execute operational plans they have developed 
for assigned missions in their geographic areas of responsibility. As 
such, the COCOMs' focus has been on current and near-term needs. The 
Center for Strategic and International Studies and others have 
advocated that mid-and long-term capability planning capacity is needed 
for COCOMs and that the functional COCOMs should perhaps play a 
stronger role in representing the regional COCOMs. Another challenge 
will be in developing appropriate criteria and measures for identifying 
capability gaps and determining the relative importance of these needed 
capabilities. Such criteria and measures have generally been lacking in 
the JCIDS process. 

Adjustments have also been made to try to streamline the JCIDS process 
to reduce the time it typically takes to validate capability proposals. 
One recent change to the process means a sponsor does not have to 
submit a CPD if the program is on track and there are no changes since 
the CDD was validated. In addition, the Joint Staff has been tracking 
the amount of time it takes to get through the various review and 
comment phases of JCIDS and implemented measures to speed up the 
adjudication of reviewers' comments on capability proposals. As a 
result, there has been some improvement in reducing the time it takes 
to validate capability proposals. For example, we found that capability 
proposals (ICDs and CDDs) took about 9.5 months to be validated during 
2003 to 2005 compared to about 8 months during 2006 to 2008. The Joint 
Staff has also recognized that the definitions used to determine what 
capability proposals must be brought to the JROC for approval is too 
broad and some proposals could be delegated to other authorities for 
validation. The definitions are being modified in part to focus JROC 
oversight on proposals that may truly warrant JROC involvement. 
Furthermore, the JROC is considering delegating authority for some JROC-
interest capability proposals to lower levels, such as the Joint 
Capabilities Board and the FCBs. 

Conclusions: 

By establishing JCIDS, DOD has, to some extent, recognized the need to 
better ensure that joint warfighting needs can be addressed within 
fiscal resource constraints. However, the process has not proven to be 
an effective approach to increase the level of joint participation or 
to prioritize the capability needs of the services, COCOMs, and other 
DOD components. While DOD has begun initiatives to improve JCIDS, the 
department continues to lack an analytic approach and an appropriate 
alignment of resources to balance competing capability needs. 
Consequently, DOD continues to start more weapons programs than current 
and likely future financial resources can support and miss 
opportunities to improve joint warfighting capabilities. Until JCIDS 
evolves from a service-centric process to a process that balances 
service and joint near-, mid-, and long-term capability needs, DOD will 
continue to contend with managing a portfolio that does not match 
available resources and risk failing to provide joint capabilities 
needed by the warfighter. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop an analytic approach within JCIDS to 
better prioritize and balance the capability needs of the military 
services, COCOMs, and other defense components. The Joint Staff should 
consider whether current efforts--particularly, the capabilities 
prioritization project--should be adopted as a framework for this 
approach. The approach should also establish appropriate criteria and 
measures for identifying capability gaps and determining the relative 
importance of near-, mid-, and long-term capability needs. Ultimately, 
the approach should provide a means to review and validate proposals 
more efficiently and ensure that the most important capability needs of 
the department are being addressed. 

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense determine and allocate 
appropriate resources for joint capabilities development planning. In 
so doing, the Secretary should consider whether the responsibility and 
capacity of the COCOMs and FCBs to conduct joint capabilities 
development planning should be increased, whether one or more of the 
functional COCOMs should be given the responsibility and capacity to 
conduct joint capabilities development planning, and whether resources 
currently residing within the military services for capabilities 
development planning should be shifted to the COCOMs and FCBs. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred 
with our first recommendation and concurred with the second 
recommendation. DOD's partial concurrence with our first 
recommendation--that an analytic approach be developed within JCIDS to 
better prioritize and balance the capability needs of the military 
services, COCOMs, and defense components--is based on the premise that 
prioritization occurs through several existing processes in the 
department, and that JCIDS is not intended to be the primary means of 
prioritizing. DOD's concurrence with our second recommendation--to 
determine and allocate appropriate resources for joint capabilities 
development planning--is based on its position that resources are 
adequate and have been allocated appropriately. The department's 
response to both of our recommendations leads us to conclude that it 
does not see a need to improve its ability to prioritize and balance 
joint capability needs. 

In commenting on our first recommendation, DOD pointed out that 
identifying, prioritizing, and balancing joint capability needs occurs 
through multiple processes both within and outside of JCIDS, such as 
COCOM integrated priority lists and JUONs, as well as through the 
department's budgeting and acquisition systems. We acknowledge that 
these DOD processes play a role in delivering capabilities to the 
warfighter; however, as we note in our report, these processes do not 
appear to be well integrated with JCIDS. Regardless, DOD established 
JCIDS as the principal process to support senior decision makers in 
identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint warfighting needs. The 
process was intended to move the department away from a service- 
centric, stovepiped approach to a joint approach that helps ensure that 
COCOMs are provided the capabilities needed to carry out military 
operations. However, many of the COCOMs do not believe that their needs 
are sufficiently addressed through JCIDS and there is no evidence that 
the process has achieved its intended goals. In fact, capability 
proposals submitted through JCIDS are not prioritized and largely 
continue to reflect insular interests. Unless an analytic approach to 
prioritize and balance the capability needs of the services, COCOMs, 
and other defense components is established, DOD will continue losing 
opportunities to strengthen joint warfighting capabilities and 
constrain its portfolio of weapon system programs. Given that JCIDS was 
established for this purpose, it seems logical to build such an 
approach within JCIDS. 

In concurring with our second recommendation, DOD asserts that the 
resources currently allocated for joint capabilities development 
planning are appropriate. However, while the FCBs may be sufficiently 
resourced to review capability proposals submitted by sponsors into 
JCIDS, they lack the resources and capacity to play a leading role in 
defining and prioritizing joint capability needs for their functional 
capability areas. In addition, while the JCIDS process provides 
opportunities for their participation, the COCOMs lack the resources 
and analytic capacity to conduct their own capability assessments or 
review proposals submitted by other sponsors. Several other recent 
studies[Footnote 29] similarly indicated that the COCOMs are 
underrepresented in the department's efforts to determine joint 
capabilities. We continue to believe that a better alignment of 
resources for conducting joint capabilities planning--among the 
services, FCBs, and COCOMs--would help the department to more 
effectively prioritize and balance competing capability needs. 

DOD also provided information about recent initiatives that are being 
implemented to improve the JCIDS, budgeting, and acquisition processes, 
and to strengthen the involvement of the joint community in determining 
capability needs. For example, since completing our draft report, the 
JROC moved to give the COCOMs a greater voice in the JCIDS process by 
delegating responsibility for validating requirements in the command 
and control functional area to the Joint Forces Command. While this 
initiative and others appear promising, as DOD notes, it is too early 
to determine whether the full benefits of these initiatives will be 
realized. 

In addition, DOD commented that our report did not sufficiently 
recognize the extent of joint participation that occurs through the 
JCIDS process. DOD stated that many of the services' proposals are in 
direct response to capability gaps identified by the COCOMs and that 
the JCIDS process is structured to provide the joint community multiple 
opportunities and time to review proposals and ensure that they 
correctly state the needs of the joint warfighter. While we agree that 
some proposals submitted to JCIDS do address joint needs, the services 
still largely drive the vast majority of capability needs that are 
pursued in the department. Furthermore, once proposals are submitted to 
JCIDS, there is little evidence of increased attention to 
prioritization or jointness that results from the review of these 
proposals. 

DOD's letter, with its written comments and description of new 
initiatives, is reprinted in appendix IV. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 
Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; and the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget. We will provide copies to others on 
request. This report will also be available at no charge on GAO's Web 
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any questions about this report or need additional 
information, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or [email protected]. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors 
to this report were John Oppenheim, Assistant Director; John Krump; 
Sean Seales; Karen Sloan; and Don Springman. 

Signed by: 

Michael J. Sullivan: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine whether the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System process has achieved its objective to prioritize joint 
warfighting needs, we analyzed information and capability documents 
contained in the Joint Staff's Knowledge Management/Decision Support 
tool[Footnote 30] compiled since the inception of JCIDS. First, we 
determined how many capability documents--initial capabilities 
documents (ICD) and capability development documents (CDD)--were 
designated "JROC-interest," which are defined as all Acquisition 
Category (ACAT) I programs and other programs whose capabilities have a 
significant impact on joint warfighting. We identified a total of 203 
capability documents--90 ICDs and 113 CDDs. We then analyzed and 
determined whether the capability documents were sponsored by the joint 
community, military services, and other Department of Defense (DOD) 
agencies. In addition, we determined which documents had completed the 
JCIDS process and been validated, which had completed the process and 
are inactive, and which are still under review. We also determined the 
amount of time required for capability documents to complete the JCIDS 
process and the amount of time other documents have remained in the 
process. We also reviewed Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) 
memorandums validating requirements documents to determine if 
requirements were assigned a priority upon validation. Further, we 
reviewed budgeted and projected program costs for major defense 
acquisitions reported by DOD's Selected Acquisition Report summary 
tables for the years 2000 to 2007, covering periods before and after 
the inception of JCIDS. 

To identify factors affecting DOD's ability to effectively implement 
JCIDS, we analyzed the existing structure of the JCIDS process and 
evaluated the sufficiency of the Joint military community workforce for 
preparing and reviewing JCIDS requirements documents. We provided 
written questionnaires to functional capability boards (FCB) to 
determine staffing and resource levels. We also evaluated recent DOD 
initiatives designed to improve the JCIDS process. 

In researching both of our primary objectives, we interviewed officials 
from the Joint Staff; DOD's FCBs; U.S. Special Operations Command; U.S. 
Joint Forces Command; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Central Command; 
Department of the Air Force; Department of the Navy; and Department of 
the Army. We reviewed statements made by DOD officials in prior 
congressional testimony. We reviewed prior GAO and other audit reports 
as well as DOD-sponsored studies related to JCIDS that were conducted 
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Institute 
for Defense Analyses, the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment 
Project, the Defense Science Board, and Booz Allen Hamilton. We 
reviewed guidance and regulations issued by the Joint Staff, the 
military services, and DOD, as well as other DOD-produced documentation 
related to JCIDS. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 to August 2008 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Functional Capabilities Boards: 

Nine FCBs have been established by the JROC to evaluate issues 
impacting their respective functional areas and provide subject matter 
expertise to the JROC. The assigned functional areas and sponsoring 
organizations of the FCBs are shown in table 1. FCBs assist the JROC in 
overseeing capabilities development within JCIDS, to include assessment 
of ICDs, CDDs, and CPDs. FCBs can only make recommendations, and are 
not empowered to approve or disapprove of proposals. 

Table 1: Functional Capabilities Boards: 

FCB: Battlespace Awareness; 
Sponsoring agency: Joint Staff, Directorate for Intelligence (J-2); 
Capability: Understand dispositions and intentions as well as the 
characteristics and conditions of the operational environment that bear 
on national and military decision making. 

FCB: Building Partnerships; 
Sponsoring agency: Joint Staff, Directorate for Strategic Plans and 
Policy (J-5); 
Capability: Set the conditions for interaction with partner, 
competitor, or adversary leaders, military forces, or relevant 
populations by developing and presenting information and conducting 
activities to affect their perceptions, will, behavior, and 
capabilities. 

FCB: Command and Control; 
Sponsoring agency: U.S. Joint Forces Command; 
Capability: Exercise authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander or decision maker over assigned and attached forces and 
resources in the accomplishment of the mission. 

FCB: Corporate Management and Support; 
Sponsoring agency: Vice Director of the Joint Staff; 
Capability: Provide strategic senior-level, enterprisewide leadership, 
direction, coordination, and oversight through a chief management 
officer function. 

FCB: Force Application; 
Sponsoring agency: Joint Staff, Directorate of Force Structure, 
Resources and Assessment (J-8); 
Capability: Integrate the use of maneuver and engagement in all 
environments to create the effects necessary to achieve mission 
objectives. 

FCB: Force Support; 
Sponsoring agency: Joint Staff, Directorate of Force Structure, 
Resources and Assessment (J-8); 
Capability: Establish, develop, and maintain capable installation 
assets across the total force to ensure that needed capabilities are 
available to support national security. 

FCB: Logistics; 
Sponsoring agency: Joint Staff, Directorate of Logistics (J-4); 
Capability: Project and sustain a logistically ready joint force 
through the deliberate sharing of national and multinational resources 
to effectively support operations, extend operational reach, and 
provide the joint force commander the freedom of action necessary to 
meet mission objectives. 

FCB: Net Centric; 
Sponsoring agency: Joint Staff, Directorate for C-4 Systems (J-6); 
Capability: Provide a framework for full human and technical 
connectivity and interoperability that allows all DOD users and mission 
partners to share the information they need, when they need it, and in 
a form which they can understand it and act on it with confidence, and 
protects information from those who should not have it. 

FCB: Protection; 
Sponsoring agency: Joint Staff, Directorate of Force Structure, 
Resources and Assessment (J-8); 
Capability: Prevent and mitigate adverse effects of attacks on 
personnel and physical assets of the United States and its allies and 
friends. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Combatant Commands: 

There are currently 10 unified combatant commands (COCOM) serving as 
DOD's operational commanders--6 with geographic responsibilities and 4 
with functional responsibilities. The 6 COCOMs with geographic 
responsibilities are U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. 
European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. 
Southern Command. Their geographic areas of responsibility are shown in 
figure 6. 

Figure 6: Combatant Commands with Geographic Responsibilities: 

[See PDF for image] 

This figure is a map of the world depicting the georgraphical 
boundaries of the six Combatant Commands. 

Source: GAO presentation of DOD data. 

Note: In February 2007, the Secretary of Defense announced that DOD 
will establish a sixth COCOM with geographic responsibilities-
-the U.S. Africa Command--which is expected to become operational by 
September 2008. 

[End of figure] 

The four functional COCOMs are U.S. Joint Forces Command, which engages 
in joint training and force provision; U.S. Special Operations Command, 
which trains, equips, and deploys special operations forces to other 
COCOMs and leads counterterrorist missions worldwide; U.S. Strategic 
Command, whose missions include space and information operations, 
missile defense, global command and control, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance, strategic deterrence, and integration 
and synchronization of DOD's departmentwide efforts in combating 
weapons of mass destruction; and U.S. Transportation Command, which 
provides air, land, and sea transportation for DOD. 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

September 17, 2008: 

Mr. Michael J. Sullivan: 
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Sullivan: 

The enclosed is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO 
Draft Report, GAO-08-1060, "Defense Acquisitions: DoD's Requirements 
Determination Process Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint 
Capabilities," dated August 5, 2008 (GAO Code 120653). 

DoD appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 
report. After reviewing the draft report, DoD partially concurs with 
the first recommendation and concurs with the second. The enclosed 
information provides amplifying comments for clarification. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

James M. Durham: 
Director: 
Joint Advanced Concepts: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

GAO Draft Report Dated August 5, 2008: 
GAO-08-1060 (GAO Code 120653): 

"Defense Acquisitions: Dod's Requirements Determination Process
Has Not Been Effective In Priortizing Joint Capabilities" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff to develop an analytic 
approach within Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS) to better prioritize and balance the capability needs of the 
military services, COCOMs, and other defense components. 

DoD Response: Partially Concur. JCIDS is not intended to be the primary 
means of prioritizing and balancing the DoD investment portfolios. 
Additional processes that contribute the total DoD prioritization 
effort include contributions from: 

* Strategic Guidance; 
* The Analytic Agenda; 
* Joint Concepts and Experimentation; 
* Defense Acquisition System; 
* Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) System; 
* Capability Portfolio Management; 
* Materiel Development Decision. 

Adopting the recommendation to develop an approach `within JCIDS' would 
foster a narrow approach that would not reflect the richness of inputs 
and analyses from multiple Joint participants that is now in effect. 
The following paragraphs provide details on the methods DoD uses to 
identify, prioritize, and balance the needs of the Services, COCOMs and 
other defense components. 

Identification of Joint Capability Needs. Within DoD, multiple venues 
exist to identify the capability needs of the joint warfighter. These 
venues exist both within and outside the JCIDS process. In accordance 
with the Chairman's Manual for the "Operation of the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System," CJCSM 3170.01C, the primary means 
within JCIDS to identify one or more joint capability needs is the 
Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA). The CBA also identifies potential 
materiel and non-materiel approaches to address those needs. 

Outside the JCIDS process, capability needs maybe identified by COCOMs, 
Services, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and 
other defense agencies through a variety of means that may ultimately 
enter into the JCIDS process. These methods include, but are not 
limited to, COCOM Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), Joint Capability 
Technology Demonstration (JCTD), Lessons Learned and Joint Urgent 
Operation Needs (JUONs). 

Prioritization of Joint Capability Needs. The GAO report recommends the 
development of an analytic approach to better prioritize the capability 
needs of the military Services. Prioritization is essential. The 
Department's resources have limits, and the needs of today must be 
balanced with our future needs. Prioritization, however, does not occur 
in a single forum or process. It is the result of multiple analytic 
efforts that occur in the capability development system, the 
acquisition system, and the Planning Programming and Budgeting System. 
The Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), for example, are an important 
statement of COCOM priorities. The Chairman submits a Chairman's 
Program Assessment (CPA) to the Secretary of Defense which reflects his 
assessment of service Program Objectives Memorandum (POMs) as judged by 
his personal strategic review. The Functional Capabilities Boards 
(FCBs) prioritize capability needs by their assessment of needs across 
their domains. 

Recently, the Department has introduced Capability Portfolio Management 
(CPM). CPM creates horizontal assessments of all Service programs in 
given functional areas, such as Command and Control. Within that 
portfolio, the CPM team (co-chaired by COCOM or Joint Staff Flag 
Officers, representatives from the FCBs, and OSD senior executives) 
prioritizes programs, recommends the addition or removal of resources, 
and presents their findings as recommendations to the Deputy Secretary 
of Defense. This is a new and potentially powerful prioritization tool 
that is highly complementary with JCIDS. The acquisition system 
continually prioritizes within its domain, balancing cost, schedule, 
and performance against the stated requirements of the warfighter. The 
POM represents each Service's statements of priorities across all the 
functional areas. JCIDS contributes to these prioritization efforts by 
complementing both the acquisition system and PPBS. 

Balancing Capability Needs of COCOMs, Services, and other Defense 
Components. The GAO report states that "JCIDS has been ineffective at 
integrating and balancing needs from the military Services, COCOMs, and 
other defense components (pg 15/GAO)." COCOMs and Services have 
different perspectives based upon their statutory requirements. COCOMs 
identify capability needs based upon current operational tasks assigned 
to them by the President and Secretary of Defense. Services are 
responsible for manning, training and equipping the joint force 
required to meet COCOM needs. Due to the time it takes to develop the 
joint force, Services must look to future needs of COCOMs in order to 
provide a balance of joint capabilities. The JCIDS process allows 
multiple venues for COCOMs and Services to provide inputs on capability 
needs in order to achieve a proper balance. Additionally, other DoD 
processes, such as the Analytic Agenda, PPBE, and Strategic Guidance 
carefully examine and adjust the balance between the needs of the 
COCOMs and Services. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
determine and allocate appropriate resources for joint capabilities 
development planning. 

DoD Response: Concur. In order to be an effective participant in the 
identification and development of fiscally informed joint capabilities, 
participating commands/organizations must be properly resourced (i.e., 
sufficient people equipped with appropriate skill sets and decision
support tools). At present, the competency for the JCIDS analyses (and 
the majority of the resources for this function) resides in the 
Services. Each Service fulfills this function as a component of a 
combatant command. Shifting the responsibility to the COCOM staff could 
impact COCOM focus on assigned mission sets if they are not 
appropriately resourced. 

The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
presently determine and allocate resources for joint capabilities 
development planning. The FCBs, by design, are matrixed organizations 
with representation from the Services, COCOMs, Joint Staff, OSD, and 
other defense agencies. When necessary, these participating 
organizations contribute resources to support FCB assessments in order 
to ensure their organizational requirements are adequately addressed. 

Annually, the FCBs present to the Vice Director, Joint Staff J-8 their 
contract man-year equivalent requirements to perform the core JCIDS 
responsibilities outlined in the Chairman's Instruction on the FCBs, 
CJCSI 3137.O1C. Based upon the restructuring of Joint Capability Areas 
(JCAs) in February 2008, J-8 fully funded each FCB's request based upon 
realignment of capability portfolios. In addition, FCBs, Services and 
COCOMs may request additional funding, as necessary, to support 
unplanned analysis required by the JROC. 

Additional DoD Comments: 

Overall comments to the draft report can be summarized in the following 
3 points: 

1) Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is 
Only One of Multiple Elements: 

The DoD uses three key processes that are aligned to identify, fund, 
and deliver joint warfighting capabilities: the JCIDS process is used 
to determine the shortfalls in capabilities across the Department; the 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process is used to 
prioritize and allocate resources; and the focus of the Acquisition 
process is cost-effective delivery of the capability. Efforts to 
address any shortcomings of the JCIDS process would be best addressed 
in the context of the entire acquisition reform effort now underway at 
DoD. There is concern that undue focus on one process will lead to an 
unbalanced solution. For example, even if the requirements process 
could produce/provide justifiable documentation in less than 6 months, 
present acquisition and budgeting processes are not flexible/agile 
enough to rapidly place new capabilities into the hands of the 
warfighter. A useful approach might be to identify JCIDS reform 
recommendations as part of a bigger solution set. 

Additionally, the JCIDS process alone does not prioritize capabilities, 
but is one of several processes the DoD uses to prioritize warfighting 
needs. Additional comments on this particular issue are detailed in the 
response to Recommendation 1. 

2) Progress Not Documented in the Report: 

While refinement of the requirements process is certainly needed, it is 
important to identify and leverage the progress that has been made to 
date. Since the GAO report was initiated, a number of reforms have been 
implemented, and the JCIDS process described in the report does not 
fully reflect the current process. Realizing the full benefits of these 
reforms will require a completed cycle of development, but we would 
like to here enumerate the works in progress. 

We also would like to highlight that the current process of joint 
requirements development attempts to strike a balance between 
development time and performance of delivered capabilities. While the 
report acknowledges some improvement in reducing JCIDS timelines (from 
10 to 8 months), it does not reflect the improvement over the 
Requirements Generation Process (predecessor to JCIDS), which on 
average took 18 months. Nor does the report recognize the leadership's 
current focus on initiatives and experiments to improve the process. 
The following initiatives are reflective of this progress: 

a) Since completion of the GAO report the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC) moved to give COCOMs (JFCOM, TRANSCOM, STRATCOM, SOCOM) 
a greater voice in the requirements process. A first step will be for 
JFCOM to review proposed new capabilities within the Command and 
Control functional area. This step represents a demonstrable shift in 
authority for requirement validation from the JROC to a Combatant 
Commander. Additional examples of Functional COCOMs acting on behalf of 
the JROC to assess proposed requirements in their designated domains 
are most likely to follow. 

b) Recently, the Department introduced Capability Portfolio Management 
(CPM). CPM creates horizontal assessments of all Service programs 
across functional areas, such as Command and Control. Within a 
portfolio, the CPM team (co-chaired by COCOM or Joint Staff Flag 
Officers, representatives from the FCBs, and OSD senior executives) 
prioritizes programs, recommends the addition or removal of resources, 
and presents their findings as recommendations to the Deputy Secretary 
of Defense. This is a new and potentially powerful prioritization 
process that is highly complementary with JCIDS. The acquisition system 
continually prioritizes within its domain, balancing cost, schedule, 
and performance against the stated requirements of the warfighter. The 
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) represents each Service's statements 
of priorities across all the functional areas. JCIDS contributes to 
these prioritization efforts by complementing both the acquisition 
system and Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). 

c) The acquisition system is also evolving in concert with changes to 
the JCIDS process. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)-initiated 
Concept Decision Initiative (CDI) assessed alternative processes for 
analysis and review to increase the effectiveness of the CJCSI 3170 
capability development process and the DoDI 5000.2 acquisition 
processes. The CDI pilot effort resulted in a number of key "Lessons 
Learned." The outcome was creation of a new decision point in the 
acquisition system called the Materiel Development Decision (MDD). 
Formerly known as the Concept Decision, MDD capitalizes on Lessons 
Learned from the CDI and provides an early, formal opportunity to weigh 
capability gaps relative to technology opportunities and resourcing. At 
the MDD, which is the mandatory formal entry point into the acquisition 
process for all programs, the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) 
determines what analysis must be conducted to assess the range of 
alternatives necessary to meet the joint capability need. The MDA's 
determination is formally captured in an Acquisition Decision 
Memorandum and the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) study guidance that 
informs succeeding acquisition decisions. 

This approach places a new emphasis on the AoA and employs it more 
effectively as a decision support tool to inform acquisition decision-
making. The result of the analysis is recommendation of one or more 
proposed materiel solution(s) that reflects maturity of key 
technologies, as well as any risks of integration and manufacturing. 
This information serves as the foundation for any follow-on development 
activity. This use of the MDD is designed to reduce programmatic risk 
and ensure stable and predictable acquisition programs. 

3) Lack of Recognition of Joint Processes for Requirements Development: 

The process of identifying joint capabilities is, of necessity, a 
balancing of current needs against investment for future needs. The DoD 
must meet the immediate needs of our warfighting commanders, yet there 
also must be sufficient investment in future capabilities to ensure our 
long-term security. No single player in the. capabilities determination 
process has the perspective required to make the best judgment. 
Capabilities determination is a collaborative process amongst the Joint 
Staff, the Services, and the Combat Support Agencies. This thoroughly 
joint process is both top-down, emanating from Joint Operations 
Concepts and Service assessments of future requirements - as well as 
bottom-up, derived from assessments conducted by the Combatant 
Commanders. In the past, the Services, with their considerable 
analytical capacity and budget authority, have been the most powerful 
players in the process. This is correctly identified in the draft GAO 
report. However, our current process, aided by improvements the JROC 
has recently initiated, reduces this imbalance by leveraging the 
Services capacity to focus on Joint capability priorities. 

The draft report argues that the lack of joint participation in the 
requirements process is evidenced by the fact that most new proposals 
for joint capabilities were sponsored by the Services. The Services 
have a statutory responsibility to man, equip, and train the joint 
force required to meet COCOM needs. In recognition of this requirement, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCSI 3170 series) directs 
development of capability documents to be the responsibility of the 
acquisition authority as sponsor. Since Services/Agencies possess 95+% 
of those funds, it is perhaps not surprising that 67% of Initial 
Capabilities Documents (ICDs) are developed by the Services. This 
statistic alone does not reflect that many of the Services' proposals 
are in direct response to capability gaps identified by the COCOMs. Nor 
does it reflect the influence that COCOM-developed Joint Capability 
Documents (JCDs) have on shaping ICDs. As the Services refine their 
requirements, COCOMs and the rest of the joint community have multiple 
opportunities for input. Indeed, part of the criticism in the report - 
the time required to validate new requirements - exists for this exact 
reason. Every member of the joint community has the right and 
obligation to scrutinize proposal requirements to ensure that they 
correctly state the needs of the joint warfighter. 

In addition, the following are responses to specific GAO statements 
within the report: 

I) "Capabilities continue to be driven primarily by the individual 
Services - which sponsored 67 percent of initial capability proposals 
submitted since 2003 - with little involvement from the COCOMs, which 
are largely responsible for planning and carrying out military 
operations (pg 2/GAO)." 

1. Joint perspective is captured as COCOMs and defense agencies provide 
inputs and are involved in key decisions for capability proposals 
within their areas of interest.
2. Often capability needs fall solely within the functional domain of a 
single service. The Services, as the force provider components of the 
COCOMs, have the functional expertise in these areas and are thereby 
assigned as sponsors of these capability proposals in fulfillment of 
their statutory obligations.
3. Programs that truly require a joint approach are developed through 
joint teams comprised of representatives from the COCOMs, Services, 
Joint Staff and other defense agencies (e.g., Joint Strike Fighter, 
Joint High Speed Vessel). 

II) "Vast majority of proposals completing JCIDS are approved (pg 
9/GAO)." 

1. Only valid capability needs complete the JCIDS process.
2. All proposals go through an extensive commenting and review process 
that includes the COCOMs, Services and OSD before being briefed to the 
FCB and JCB. Through this comment and review process, changes are made 
in the documents to ensure they meet the needs of the joint warfighter 
prior to their approval by the JROC.
3. There are a significant number of instances in which valid 
capability needs are not entered into JCIDS because there are 
sufficient, existing means to address the gap, the technology required 
is not sufficiently developed or it is decided to accept risk 
associated with the capability gap. 

III) "JCIDS proposals are not prioritized across capability and mission 
areas. Instead, the extent to which any prioritization has occurred 
within JCIDS has been limited to the key performance parameters or 
requirements individual capability proposals (pg 10/GAO)." 

1. During the conduct of a CBA, joint concepts are evaluated against 
the current and programmed force across one or more mission areas. 
Capability needs identified during the CBA are then prioritized. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] DOD's weapon system investments are based on JCIDS and two other 
decision-making processes: the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 
Execution system, for allocating financial resources, and the Defense 
Acquisition System, for managing product development and procurement. 

[2] S. Rep. No. 109-69 at 343-346 (2005). 

[3] We also issued a report recently examining the impact of DOD's 
resource allocation process on major weapon system programs. See GAO, 
Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could Improve 
Major Weapon System Program Outcomes, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-619] (Washington, D.C.: July 
2, 2008). 

[4] COCOMs are DOD's operational commanders. There are six COCOMs with 
geographic responsibilities and four with functional responsibilities. 
See app. III for more information on COCOMs. 

[5] The national military strategy describes the Armed Forces' plan to 
achieve military objectives in the near term and is intended to provide 
the vision for ensuring that they remain decisive in the future. 

[6] When weapon systems are interoperable, information can be directly 
exchanged and used. 

[7] The Quadrennial Defense Review is a major DOD review done every 4 
years that is designed to provide a comprehensive examination of the 
national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, 
infrastructure, and budget plans. 

[8] The JROC consists of the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and the four military service vice chiefs. 

[9] Currently, there are nine FCBs--made up of representatives from the 
military services, COCOMs, and other DOD entities--established within 
JCIDS: Battlespace Awareness, Building Partnerships, Command and 
Control, Corporate Management and Support, Force Application, Force 
Support, Logistics, Net Centric, and Protection. See app. II for more 
information on FCBs. 

[10] Other capability proposals that are determined to have less joint 
impact do not have to go through the full JCIDS process and are usually 
validated and approved by the sponsoring organization. 

[11] An analysis of alternatives is typically developed by the 
acquisition community and is an evaluation of the performance, 
effectiveness, suitability, and estimated costs of alternative systems 
to meet a capability. 

[12] Depending on the capability being acquired, not all documents may 
be required. For example, when a capability is being completely 
delivered through a commercial-off-the-shelf solution with no 
development or significant integration required, a CDD is not typically 
required. 

[13] Army Audit Agency, Army's Capabilities Determination Process, A- 
2006-0224-ALA (Sept. 27, 2006). 

[14] Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment 
Project for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment Report (January 2006). 

[15] Defense Science Board, Summer Study on Transformation: A Progress 
Assessment (February 2006). 

[16] Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater 
Nichols, Department of Defense Acquisition and Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution Reform, Phase III Report (Washington, D.C.: 
August 2006), and Invigorating Defense Governance: A Beyond Goldwater- 
Nichols Phase IV Report (Washington, D.C.: March 2008). 

[17] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Management Approach and Processes 
Not Well-Suited to Support Development of the Global Information Grid, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-211] (Washington, 
D.C.: Jan. 30, 2006). 

[18] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD's 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-578] (Washington, D.C.: May 
17, 2007). 

[19] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to 
Experience Cost and Schedule Problems under DOD's Revised Policy, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-368] (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 13, 2006). 

[20] It should be noted that as of March 2008, if a major defense 
acquisition program has a Milestone A review it may not receive 
Milestone A approval to begin a technology development program until 
the Milestone Decision Authority certifies to Congress that (1) the 
system fulfills an approved initial capabilities document; (2) the 
system is being executed by an entity with a relevant core competency 
as identified by the Secretary of Defense; (3) if the system duplicates 
a capability already provided by an existing system, the duplication 
provided by such system is necessary and appropriate; and (4) a cost 
estimate for the system has been submitted. DOD is currently revising 
its policy and guidance for conducting and certifying Milestone A 
reviews. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. 
L. No. 110-181, � 943, (2008). 

[21] GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach 
to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-388] (Washington, 
D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007). 

[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-619]. 

[23] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: The Army Faces Challenges in Developing 
a Tactical Networking Strategy, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-10SU] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2006). 

[24] In 2005, DOD's Office of General Counsel determined that the 
amount of funding for JNN-N exceeded the threshold for establishing a 
major defense acquisition program and that it must comply with 
applicable laws and DOD policies. The Army subsequently had a 
capability document validated through the JCIDS process and established 
JNN-N as a formal program in 2007, by absorbing it into the first 
increment of the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical program. 

[25] A JUON is an urgent operational need identified by a COCOM 
involved in an ongoing military operation. The purpose of the JUON 
process is to gain Joint Staff validation and funding, usually within 
days or weeks, to meet high-priority COCOM needs. The scope of a JUON 
is limited to needs that (1) fall outside of the established military 
service processes and (2) if not addressed immediately, will seriously 
endanger personnel or pose a major threat to ongoing operations. The 
proposed solution to this type of COCOM need is not supposed to involve 
the development of a new technology or capability. 

[26] GAO, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can 
Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of 
Future ISR Requirements, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-374] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2008). 

[27] Booz Allen Hamilton, Follow-up to Chief, JCD Functional 
Capabilities Board Analytic Assessment Final Report Brief, study done 
for the Joint Staff (July 9, 2007). 

[28] Institute for Defense Analyses, Improving Integration of 
Department of Defense Processes for Capabilities Development and 
Planning (September 2006); Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic 
Era, Phase I Report (March 2004); and Joint Defense Capabilities Study 
Team (DOD), Joint Defense Capabilities Study: Improving DOD Strategic 
Planning, Resourcing, and Execution to Satisfy Joint Capabilities, 
Final Report (January 2004). 

[29] Institute for Defense Analyses, Improving Integration of 
Department of Defense Processes for Capabilities Development and 
Planning (September 2006); Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic 
Era, Phase I Report (March 2004); and Joint Defense Capabilities Study 
Team (DOD), Joint Defense Capabilities Study: Improving DOD Strategic 
Planning, Resourcing, and Execution to Satisfy Joint Capabilities, 
Final Report (January 2004). 

[30] This system is designed to track the status of capability proposal 
documents--ICDs, CDDs, CPDs, and other documents---submitted to the 
JCIDS process for review. It is the key system that the Joint Staff and 
other DOD components use to review and comment on proposals. To assess 
the reliability of the data system, we interviewed Joint Staff 
officials knowledgeable about the system. We determined that the data 
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

[End of section] 

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Which sustainment key performance parameter is identified in the CDD?

What are the performance parameters?

What are the 4 mandatory key performance parameters?

What three statements define key performance parameters?